



## Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

August 30, 2007

### MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

  
MARK B. WHITAKER, JR.

DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD  
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report,  
April – June (2nd Quarter CY2007)

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from April to June 2007. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded:

74% Fully Qualified (last Quarter was 72%)  
94% Staffing Level (last Quarter was 91%)  
45% Time Spent in the Field (DOE goal is >40%)  
72% Time Spent in Oversight Activities (DOE Goal is > 65%)

Percentages are based on FR staffing analyses at **202** Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) and **190** FTEs actual staffing.

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the Facility Representative web site at <http://www.hss.doe.gov/deprep/facrep/>. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me or the DOE Facility Representative Program Manager, James Heffner at 202-586-3690.

Attachment



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Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report  
August 30, 2007

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## ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2007)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
CBFO	1	2	2	200	0	100	50	64	76
ID (ICP)	13	12	12	92	0	100	83	47	86
OR/EM	19	17	16	84	0	94	63	46	71
ORP	14	14	14	100	0	14	93	44	72
PPPO	4	4	4	100	0	100	100	41	73
RL	19	19	19	100	0	100	89	45	69
SR	30	30	27	90	0	89	78	53	60
WVDP	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	43	70
<b>EM Totals</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

\* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

#### EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- An Idaho FR at the Facility and Material Disposition Project (FMDP) supported a DOE Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for startup of the AFCI Glovebox at the Material and Fuels Complex. The FR made significant contribution to the ORR team in reviewing the Operation and Training areas.
- An Idaho FMDP FR observed soil removal activities in support of setting up trailers for temporary office space. The FR noticed that the work group was not adhering to "Underground Contamination Area" postings for the area. When this was brought to the worker's attention, they immediately complied.
- An Idaho FR at the Waste Disposition Project (WDP) discovered during a pre-startup authorization review that the contractor's calibration procedure for the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP)-2 Fire Protection System was inadequate. As such, the fire protection equipment had never been properly calibrated.
- An ORP FR observed and corrected workers moving scissor lifts at relatively high speeds under pipe supports with only three and one half inches of space between the hand rail and the piping support. Workers were leaning out of the lift or squatting down to clear the support exposing them to crushing injuries if they made a mistake. The lifts were equipped with controls so that the lifts can be operated from the floor while walking next to the equipment to reduce the risk to the employee.
- At Oak Ridge, FRs provided significant oversight at Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) in preparation for operation. There are three full-time FRs assigned to MSRE.
- During an Integrated Safety Management System Phase II Assessment of the contractor, an ORP FR reported that controls identified in worksite hazard analyses were inconsistent with controls actually placed in working procedures. The contractor has corrected this condition.
- While observing steel erection activities at the Waste Treatment Plant Laboratory building, an ORP FR observed that the red barricade tape for falling object protection was inadequately positioned on the perimeter of the lab. This concern was brought to the attention of the foreman who had the situation corrected by moving the barricade further out.
- During construction activities a Paducah FR identified that HVAC duct work was being insulated with the potential for field welds to be covered. The associated technical specification requires welds to pass a visual inspection during ductwork strength and tightness testing. Insulation installation activities were suspended until strength and tightness testing is completed.

- A Paducah FR review of a contractors annual update to Work Smart Standards (WSS) identified a weakness in that the WSS failed to recognize 10 CFR 851 as a mitigating standard. The Contractors 10 CFR 851 compliant worker safety and health program had been reviewed and approved during the period that the WSS was being updated. The annual update was not accepted until references recognizing 10 CFR 851 have been resolved.
- Richland FRs performed a site wide core surveillance covering Training and Qualification Programs. In addition, River Corridor Project FRs performed a project wide surveillance covering Authorization Basis Implementation/Unreviewed Safety Questions Program.
- A Richland FR identified several issues related to the conduct of TRU retrieval operations; specifically, propane tanks in place with expired permits, no basis document for outside airborne radiation areas, no recovery plan procedure, inappropriate use of Minor Work Tickets, areas to improve radiological postings and radiological practices, areas to improve Occupational Safety & Health Administration safety, areas to improve Emergency Preparedness, and procedure compliance issues.
- Two recent Richland FR hires successfully completed the DOE General Technical Base Qualification Standard and the DOE Functional Standard to become core qualified.
- At Savannah River, HB-Line and AMWDP FRs participated in the K-Area Interim Surveillance ORR.
- A Savannah K-Area FR identified issues with work planning in L-Area.
- A Savannah River FR for AMWDP identified an error with a lockout/tagout, which upon review by the facility identified an error with the computer based system used for lockout/tagout preparations.
- A Savannah River FR for AMWDP identified an issue with the Flammability Evaluation required prior to liquid additions into a waste tank. The operation was stopped until the required evaluation was completed.
- A WVDP FR performed surveillances of the Procedure Review Team and of the ISMS Self-Assessment Team. The Teams were tasked to review the adequacy of hazard controls in Standard Operating Procedures and assess implementation of Integrated Safety Management in field level activities.
- FRs at WVDP performed a Conduct of Operations surveillance identifying many safety issues.

## NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2007)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	11	11	11	100	0	100	91	45	78
OR (NE) ***	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>NE Totals</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

\*\*\* At Oak Ridge DOE-SC took ownership of all FR covered facilities in March 2007 except for Building 3047, which is still DOE-NE. Building 3047 is in standby mode and only gets looked at once per quarter, which amounts to less than one percent of a FR's time. All FR activity is now reported in the DOE-SC section of the Quarterly Performance Indicator Report.

#### NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- An Idaho FR, while touring the Specific Manufacturing Capability Facility, noted several construction workers dismantling an overhead control booth without using appropriate signs and barriers to prevent foot traffic from entering the construction area under the booth contrary to the Job Safety Analysis. The issue was brought to the attention of the Construction Foreman and was immediately corrected.
- Following inquiry by an Idaho FR at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), facility management concluded a TSR violation occurred at MFC's Fuel Conditioning Facility when modes of operation for the Argon Cell were shifted while certain interlocks were inoperable. The event was categorized ORPS reportable, Group 3, Subgroup A(2), Significance Category 2.
- During a routine walkthrough, an Idaho FR at the MFC noticed an open energized electrical instrument cabinet in the Sodium Components Maintenance Shop. The FR's inquired about exposed electrical terminals and the cabinet not roped off or guarded to prevent exposure to the hazard. The event was critiqued and determined to be ORPS reportable.

## NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2007)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO	11	11	9	82	0	100	44	36	58
LSO	10	9	9	90	0	66	33	49	77
NSO	10	10	8	80	0	100	75	53	70
PXSO	10	10	10	100	0	100	60	46	75
SRSO	4	4	4	100	0	75	50	41	87
SSO	11	11	11	100	0	91	45	39	69
YSO	12	11	11	92	0	100	64	43	68
<b>NNSA Totals</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

#### NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- A LASO FR completed verification of pre-starts resulting from the 2004 WETF ORR for expansion of HC 2 nuclear tritium operations in Building 450 and implementation of the DSA.
- A LASO FR served as the POC for the WCRRF MSA coordinating SMEs and other FRs as well as maintenance and QA personnel for expanded oversight of the WCRRF MSA. This FR also served as LASO POC for the WCRRF CORR. Functions included attending all CORR team meetings and WCRRF Management team status meetings for the CORR.
- A SSO FR played a key role in the completion and approval of the GIF – SER for the upgraded DSA. The approved DSA resolves several long running corrective actions from the 2005 OA audit and a 2006 PISA.
- A SSO FR, as the only federal oversight at SNL/CA, played a key role in SNL/CA receiving one of the five 2007 NNSA Pollution Prevention (P2) Star Awards for this year, titled Project Management and Systems approach to EMS, Unique Approaches and Techniques Result in Rapid and Effective EMS Implementation.
- At LASO, a Future Leaders Program participant converted to FR status on 8 July and will be included in the Actual Staffing count next quarter. The vacancy announcement for the eleventh position closed in June. Regarding qualification, three FRs are fully qualified and assigned to facilities. The fourth is in proficiency training per paragraph 5.5.7 of DOE-STD-1063 following extended military deployment, but is performing FR functions appropriate to his situation. Six FRs were in training during the quarter - one finished qualification, while the remaining 5 will qualify during the next reporting quarter.
- At Pantex, three FRs completed their core qualifications.
- At YSO, a FR found that a lift fixture was being used with modified and damaged eyebolts that were not in accordance with original design. The design specification and fixture were modified and properly configured eyebolts were used to replace the defective ones.
- At YSO, a FR identified several unrestricted access areas that had beryllium surface contamination higher than the release limit. Corrective actions were initiated and personnel access restricted until cleanup can be accomplished.
- At YSO, a FR was instrumental in getting operations secured and personnel out of an aging and hazardous building that was no longer safe to occupy. Subsequent to that action numerous unidentified hazards have been brought to light that have severely restricted personnel access to the building until it is torn down and decontaminated.
- During a review of the implementation of TSR specific administrative controls, a LSO FR identified that the

contractor's implementing procedure did not address one of the specific administrative controls that limits quantity of tritium in a single vessel.

- Four LSO FRs-in-training completed their core qualifications, and have been designated as Interim Qualified FRs.
- Pantex FRs supported two NNSA Readiness Assessments.
- SRSO FRs identified issues with storage of hazardous materials in the Tritium facilities. The contractor has implemented corrective actions to correct the deficiencies.
- SRSO FRs performed a reactive maintenance assessment which identified issues with maintenance procedure quality and compliance. The contractor has developed a corrective action plan to improve performance.
- SSO FRs provided oversight of the Logistics Nuclear Operations start-up activities including the line management self-assessment and the contractor ORR.
- The NSO FRs participated in the pre-planning stages of an Operational Readiness Review for the new start of a category 3 nuclear facility at the Device Assembly Facility for glove box operations.
- The NSO sponsored the Facility Representative annual conference in May.
- Two NSO FRs completed the FR Technical Qualification Program, and one new FR joined the program after completion of the Future Leaders Program. There are nine FR positions actually staffed at this time. Since one FR is on extended military leave, the staffing number of eight is indicative of the number of FRs currently on the job.

## OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

### Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2007)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
AMES	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	20	80
ASO	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	21	92
BHSO	6	6	6	100	0	100	67	34	84
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	39	92
OR (SC)	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	46	76
PNSO	2	1.5	1.5	75	0	100	100	48	81
<b>SC Totals</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>DOE GOALS</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>&gt;80</b>	<b>&gt;40</b>	<b>&gt;65</b>

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\*\* % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

#### SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- A PNSO FR has been participating as the site representative on the Source Evaluation Board evaluating the re-bid of the PNNL contract since the beginning of April 2006. This assignment is anticipated to last through September 2007 and amount to approximately 0.5 FTE of time. No replacement is currently planned, so the FR staffing will show a reduction of 0.5 FTE during this period.
- A PNSO FR responded to the Incident Command Post to monitor the contractor's response to the discovery of a leaking plutonium-238 sealed source that resulted in radioactive contamination being discovered off-site and a significance category 2 occurrence report being issued.
- At Oak Ridge, FR emphasis was placed on post restart activities at the High Flux Isotope Reactor, operational activities at the ORNL Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities and Accelerator Facilities.
- BHSO FRs were involved in a variety of activities this quarter that do not qualify as direct BNL field time. These activities were deemed important for sustaining and improving BHSO's oversight of BNL and to DOE's complex-wide, overall mission. FR activities are proactively and consciously balanced against facility risk, complexity, and activity level so that value added support is ensured.
- FSO FRs were involved in numerous safety activities and initiatives including the DOE FSO review of the Fermilab Hoisting and Rigging Program, DOE FSO review of the Emergency Eye Wash and Safety Shower Inspection and Maintenance Program, preparation for the Accelerator Safety Workshop, preparation for the Accelerator Shutdown, and development/implementation of the 10CFR 851 Implementation Plan.
- PNSO FRs monitored preparations, pre-job briefings, and conduct of work to enter a Radiochemical Processing Lab hot cell to remove larger waste items and install research equipment. The job was well planned and actual personnel exposures were below pre-job estimates.
- Several BHSO FRs performed the review on the BNL 10 CFR 851 Worker Safety and Health Program Description.
- Two BHSO FRs completed a material handling assessment which identified several findings.
- Two BHSO FRs completed working on the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor (BGRR) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the upcoming D&D of the BGRR.